CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 10 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. C.O. HOLLIST (Nigeria)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
	Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. V. SAFAR
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mr. M. TELLO
	Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ
Nigeria:	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:	Mr. H. JAROSZEK
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. N. ECOBESCO
	Mr. M. MALITZA
	Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCO
	Mr. V. TARZIORU
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. T. RULFF
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. N.S. KISHILOV
	Mr. V.A. USTINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. El REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mr. M.E. HOWELL
United States of America:	Mr. A.S. FISHER
	Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Mr. D. PROTITCH

1. The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the 402nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): As you will recall, at our meeting on 25 March, the day on which the working document on the establishment of nuclear-free zones submitted by the delegation of Mexico was circulated as ENDC/241, I ventured to indicate (ENDC/PV.397, para. 109) that my delegation intended in due course to make some comments on the contents of that working document. That is the main purpose of the present statement, although we wish to make some preliminary observations on three other subjects which have been dealt with by various members of the Committee.

3. The establishment of nuclear-free zones is in itself an effective measure of nuclear disarmament. In fact, it necessarily implies an absolute ban on those weapons in the territories of all the States parties to the treaty by which the zone is established, since the purpose of the treaty must be to guarantee the complete absence of nuclear weapons from the zone to which it applies regardless of which State has dominion or control over such weapons. Thus, for example, if it were to prove possible to bring into force a multilateral instrument of universal scope similar to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186), this would automatically solve the problem of nuclear disarmament since it would entail the elimination of the gigantic nuclear arsenals which now exist in the world.

4. Therefore it is regrettable that, although the possibility and desirability of establishing nuclear-free zones in various geographical areas has been talked about on various occasions for over ten years, so far it has been possible to establish only one which covers inhabited lands -- the Latin American zone brought into being by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

5. The inertia which we have witnessed as regards this important aspect of disarmament led the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to note in one of its resolutions that:

> "... the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the initiative of the States situated within each zone concerned, is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass destruction and to promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament". (A/7277, resolution B; ENDC/241, annex V)

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Moreover, it noted:

"that a nuclear-weapon-free zone is of benefit to the security and economic development of the States within the zone, since it frees their territories from the danger of nuclear attacks and avoids the squandering of their resources on the production of nuclear armaments," (ibid.).

On the basis of those considerations, the Conference recommended:

"that all non-nuclear-weapon States not comprised in the zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco initiate or continue such studies as they may deem opportune concerning the possibility and desirability of establishing by treaty the military denuclearization of their respective zones, provided that political and security conditions permit," (ibid.)

6. That pertinent recommendation of the Conference, which met in this very city from the end of August to the end of September 1968, acquired even greater force when it was explicitly repeated on 20 December 1968 by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 2456B (XXIII) (ENDC/237).

7. I said just now that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is the only instrument applicable to inhabited territories which it has so far been possible to conclude on this subject. I would add that in our opinion, it provides a fine example that is very instructive in regard to the many and varied aspects which will have to be taken into account in the establishment of future nuclear-free zones. It is not my intention to undertake a commentary on or, still less, an analysis of the provisions of the Treaty, because I think that all of them are well known to the members of this Committee, to whom I had the honour of presenting the Treaty a little more than two years ago on 21 February 1967 (ENDC/PV.387, paras. 47-77) -- when it could be said that the ink of the signatures to the Treaty was still fresh, since it had been signed only a week before, on 14 February 1967.

8. I shall therefore confine myself to recalling three of the principal features of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. They are the following:

9. The first feature is the apt formulation of the provisions designed to prohibit for ever nuclear weapons in the territories of the States Parties, without leaving any possible loophole, since those States would be obliged under the Treaty itself:

"to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, ..." (ENDC/186, article 1, para. 1)

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and:

"to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon". (ibid., para. 2)

10. The second feature is that the Treaty is the first international instrument on disarmament which includes a system of effective control composed of permanent supervisory organs. This system includes the full application of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, but its scope is much greater. On the one hand, its purpose is not only to verify:

"That devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons;" (ibid., article 12, para. 2a)

but also to prevent anyone from carrying out in the territories of the Contracting Parties any of the activities prohibited in article 1 of the Treaty with nuclear materials or weapons introduced from abroad, as well as to ensure that any explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible with article 18 of the Treaty.

11. On the other hand, the Treaty assigns important control functions to the three principal organs of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America established under it -- the General Conference, the Council and the Secretariat. The Treaty also provides for the presentation by the Parties of periodic and special reports, the possibility of carrying out special inspections, and the transmission of reports on the results of those inspections to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

12. The third feature is that, although special care has been taken to preclude any possibility of evading in any way the absolute prohibition of nuclear weapons, it has at the same time been made unequivocally clear that this prohibition does not in the least affect the peaceful use of the atom, in regard to which, on the contrary, emphasis has been laid on the right of Latin American States to the maximum and most equitable possible access to this new source of energy, namely nuclear energy, for the purpose of promoting their economic and social progress.

13. It was certainly those and similar reasons which led the Secretary-General of the United Nations to State, in the message he addressed to the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America on 12 February 1967, on the occasion of the unanimous approval of the Treaty of Tlatelolco that the result that had been achieved would be an important stimulant for progress in other disarmament measures of world-wide as well as of regional significance, and that the importance of the work that had been

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done went beyond that of the field of nuclear disarmament; it contributed in a concrete way to the promotion of international peace and security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations also said that the nations of Latin America could, with ample justification, take pride in what they had wrought by their own initiative and through their own efforts.

14. Several months later the United Nations General Assembly formulated an equally laudatory judgement in resolution 2286 (XXII) in which, after welcoming with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, it declared.

> "... [the Treaty] constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples". (ENDC/210)

15. In the same resolution, the General Assembly addressed a number of pressing appeals to all States, to those which were or might become signatories of the Treaty or of Additional Protocol I and to the Powers possessing nuclear weapons. It called upon the first to: "give their full co-operation to ensure that the regime laid down in the Treaty enjoys the universal observance to which its lofty principles and noble aims entitle it". It recommended the second: "to strive to take all the measures within their power to ensure that the Treaty speedily obtains the widest possible application among them". As regards the Powers possessing nuclear weapons, it invited them "to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty as soon as possible".

16. With respect to the last appeal, addressed to the States possessing nuclear weapons, it should be borne in mind that the obligations which they are called upon to assume are those which are defined in the Protocol itself and which come down to the following three undertakings:

(a) to respect "in all its express aims and provisions" the "status of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America";

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(b) "not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies;

and

(c) "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty ..." (ENDC/186, p. 32).

17. An analysis of the provisions of Additional Protocol II which I have just quoted, clearly shows that the obligations which the signature and ratification of that Protocol entails for the nuclear Powers are far from being unusual or burdensome; on the contrary, they correspond faithfully to the letter and the spirit of the repeated exhortations of the United Nations General Assembly in numerous resolutions, among which it is appropriate to recall in particular resolution 1911 (XVIII) in which the Assembly expressed its confidence that the nuclear Powers would "lend their full co-operation for the effective realization" of the military denuclearization of Latin America; and resolution 2153 A (XXI)(ENDC/185), in which the General Assembly called upon: "all nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against States which may conclude treaties" designed to guarantee the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories -- such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

18. That is certainly why the General Assembly, as we have already said, in resolution 2286 (XXII) specifically invited the Powers possessing nuclear weapons: "... to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty [of Tlatelolco] as soon as possible". That is also why the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, after regretting in its resolution B that "not all the nuclear-weapon States have yet signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco" urged "the nuclear-weapon Powers to comply fully" with the above invitations, and that is also why the General Assembly itself, in resolution 2456 B (XXIII), reiterated the exhortation of that Conference.

19. Thus, five resolutions on this question have been adopted from 1963 to the present time by organizations of a world-wide character which may rightly be considered as expressing world public opinion -- resolution all of which unquestionably respond to what was expressly stated in one of them: the conviction that

"... for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol". (A/7277, resolution B, ENDC/241, annex V)

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20. In the light of those repeated exhortations it seems rather strange that Additional Protocol II has so far been signed by only two nuclear Powers -- chronologically, the United Kingdom and the United States of America -- and that it has not been ratified by any of them, despite the fact that it has been open to signature for more than two years, since 14 February 1967, and also despite the fact that the Treaty to which it is annexed has been signed by the twenty-one States which drafted it, and by Barbados and that it is now fully in effect in ten of those States, namely, Mexico, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay, States which have ratified it, completely waiving the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of article 28.

21. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the careful preparatory work which preceded it could undoubtedly be studied very fruitfully by the Committee when an opportunity arises to tackle the question of the establishment of nuclear-free zones, a question which was included in its agenda on 15 August 1968 (ENDC/236, p.3).

22. However, without waiting for that time to come, which unfortunately may not be very soon, Additional Protocol II of the Treaty offers immediately to the nuclear Powers, and in particular to those participating in the work of this Committee, a magnificant opportunity to support with deeds the praiseworthy ideas which some of their representatives expound here from time to time concerning the desirability of nuclear-free zones. They usually say, quite rightly, that the establishment of such zones -- and I quote something that was said here recently -- would reduce international tension, limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and serve the cause of peace.

23. My delegation ventures to hope that the working document on this question which it presented to the Committee and which was reproduced on 24 March of this year as ENDC/241, may make a positive contribution to the two objectives to which I have just referred: both the general objective related to the study of the question listed in the agenda of the Committee, and the very concrete and specific objective related to the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- under which, we must always bear in mind, the only nuclear-free zone covering inhabited territories was established -- so that this Treaty can acquire the

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greatest possible effectiveness through the signature and ratification of its two Additional Protocols and most particularly Additional Protocol II, to which only the five States possessing weapons can become parties.

24. I have now concluded the main part of this statement relating to the question of nuclear-free zones. As I indicated at the beginning, I should now like to make very briefly a few preliminary observations on the following three points: the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed; the drafting of a treaty for the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests; and the establishment of a co-ordinated work programme for our Committee.

25. With respect to the first of these points, my delegation was pleased to note that one of the co-Chairmen, the Soviet representative, submitted to the Committee at the opening meeting of this session a draft treaty (ENDC/240) which, in our view, is an adequate basis for negotiation, and the text of which we are studying very carefully with all the interest it merits. We were also pleased to hear the statements made on that subject by the Soviet representative and by the other co-Chairman, the United States representative, since we gather from those statements that, despite the understandable differences still existing at this initial stage between the two super Powers, there are already some points of agreement which are by no means negligible.

26. If we take into account the fact that several of the treaties which it has been possible to conclude over the last few years contain important elements which can easily be used for what we now have in mind, as well as the consensus which clearly emerged on the question at the twenty-second and twenty-third sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, we must conclude that this is one of the items on the agenda of the Committee which are now ripe enough for the obligations which States would assume in that respect to be defined in a multilateral contractual instrument.

27. If the members of the Committee, and in particular the co-Chairmen, show the necessary flexibility in their respective positions, we think it will be possible -- and, we must add, extremely desirable -- for the report which the Committee is to transmit to the General Assembly concerning its sessions this year to contain the complete text of a draft treaty on the subject. In order to achieve that, we feel that it would be very appropriate if the United States delegation could, in the near future, set out its

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point of view in a draft text which, regardless of its content, would meet the essential requirement -- as does, in our opinion, the text submitted by the Soviet Union -- of conforming to the general feeling expressed in the discussions in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, that the exploration, use and exploitation of the sea-bed should be exclusively for peaceful purposes.

28. The experience acquired in the case of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) -- when, it will be recalled, the Committee had before it at the beginning draft treaties submitted by the two super Powers (ENDC/192 and 193) -- would seem to indicate that this would facilitate the conciliatory and constructive work of the other delegations designed to achieve a fusion of the two drafts into a single document, for which if the authors of those drafts showed the necessary receptiveness to the views of the other delegations, we believe that it would be possible to obtain general approval. It would also contribute to the achievement of that aim if in due course an appropriate working procedure were adopted which might include the holding of informal meetings and the establishment of an ad hoc special sub-committee of the whole.

29. As regards the question of prohibiting underground nuclear-weapon tests, first of all I should like to recall that this is a problem to whose solution we have constantly given special importance ever since our work began in 1962. That is why there have been so many references to this subject, both lengthy and brief, in the statements made by the delegation of Mexico and contained in the records. To cite only the main ones during the first five years of the work of the Committee, I shall mention those which my delegation made at the 14th, 28th, 34th, 53rd, 56th, 63rd, 80th, 85th, 148th, 196th, 205th, 242nd, and 264th meetings.

30. In one of those statements, that of 6 August 1964, my delegation said:

> "... the Moscow Treaty was anything but an epilogue -- merely a prologue, whose immediate sequel, disregarding for the moment its long-term results, should be a ban on underground nuclear tests, so that these tests should be abolished altogether in every medium. This is not merely speculation or wishful thinking, for the preamble to the Moscow Treaty expresses the desire of the original Parties 'to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time' (ENDC/100/Rev.1). As if that were not enough, it states in the next line that the Governments of the original Parties are 'determined to continue negotiations to this end'" (ENDC/PV.205, p.13).

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31. That statement, together with the fact that nearly five years later we find ourselves in a situation substantially identical to that which existed then, explains why my delegation has noted with great appreciation that the Swedish delegation has submitted a draft treaty on the subject (ENDC/242), whose title sufficiently explains its constructive purpose: "Working Paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a Treaty Banning Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests".

32. Indeed, we share the view expressed here on 1 April by the Swedish representative to the effect that in cases such as this, when we have waited in vain for long years for the presentation of drafts or preliminary drafts by the Powers acting as co-Chairmen of the Committee, it is for any of the other delegations of the member States to take the initiative since, as was so well said by Mrs. Myrdal, "we all share the responsibility for action" (ENDC/PV.399, para. 36).

33. I would venture to add that, with respect to both this draft and the other submitted in connexion with the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof (ENDC/240), as well as all other drafts which may be submitted on this or any other question included in the programme of work approved on 15 August last, the Committee should endeavour to consider these in a methodical and orderly manner, paragraph by paragraph if necessary. Thus we would in due course be able to transmit to the General Assembly documents which either had received the unanimous approval of the Committee or contained at least a considerable part on which there had been a consensus in the Committee, although there might still exist some differences of opinion on some of the provisions, perhaps even fundamental differences. As regards these last, that is the provisions on which differences of opinion still exist, one could include in parallel columns alternative texts already drafted in the form of articles, or paragraphs of articles, for insertion in the treaty which is being elaborated.

34. It seems to us that this would have a number of advantages: it would limit the areas of disagreement and perhaps also enlarge the areas of agreement; it would avoid giving the General Assembly the erroneous impression that our deliberations are rather Byzantine; it would make it easier for the members of the General Assembly to come to a decision with full knowledge of the case on the various alternatives; finally, it would help to make less slow our progress in the tasks entrusted to us, since the reconciliation of the existing divergencies would signify in each case the automatic completion of the drafting of the corresponding treaty.

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35. In short, we believe that after seven years of general discussion, the time has come to proceed, in regard to various items on our agenda, to the consideration of what in the General Assembly are draft resolutions and in our case should be draft treaties.

36. With regard to the third and last of the points to which I have previously referred, namely the establishment of a co-ordinated programme of work for the Committee and the adoption of procedural measures which would make for greater effectiveness in our work, I had the opportunity, in my statement of 18 March (ENDC/PV.395, para.57), to make a number of specific suggestions. Subsequently, almost all the representatives who have spoken have referred to this question -- in particular the representatives of Italy (ENDC/PV.397, paras.49-51) and Romania (ENDC/PV.400, paras.75 et seq.), both of whom dealt with the matter at considerable length.

37. My delegation would therefore like to confine itself now to suggesting, for the time still available to the Committee in this first part of its 1969 session, that each week we should have an additional weekly meeting of an informal nature, which could be held perhaps on Wednesday mornings if, as may be expected, the group of non-aligned States were willing to hold their meeting in the afternoon of the same day. These informal meetings would be devoted exclusively to the study of the question to which I have referred previously: the establishment of a co-ordinated programme of work and the adoption of a procedure which would offer the greatest prospects of effectiveness. We would thus be able to examine thoroughly those aspects which, although primarily procedural, nevertheless have a special importance, while continuing in parallel at the formal meetings on Tuesdays and Thursdays the consideration and study of the substantive questions of our agenda.

38. I have now come to the end of my statement and I apologize for having spoken at such length.

39. As the duties of my post make it necessary for me to return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of my country, this is the last meeting of the Committee in which I shall be able to participate at the present session. I should therefore like to take this opportunity to say farewell to all my colleagues and to wish them the greatest success in their tasks which of course, even though it may be from afar, I shall endeavour to follow with the same interest as I have always tried to do when I have participated in the deliberations of this Conference.

40. The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I think I may say on behalf of the Committee that we shall miss the valuable contribution of the representative of Mexico and wish him "Bon Voyage", with the hope of seeing him again soon.

41. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have just heard a very detailed and interesting statement by the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles. The Soviet delegation will study it with all the attention it deserves.

42. In our statement today we should like, within the context of item 1 of our agenda (ENDC/230, p.3), to dwell upon questions of nuclear disarmament. The primary importance of this problem has been recorded in the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). In this connexion I should like to emphasize that it is precisely this non-proliferation Treaty that is now the starting point for further progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. We should like to express the hope that the Treaty will come into force as soon as possible, which would no doubt give a new impetus to the efforts of States in the aforesaid field.

43. In our statement on 18 March (ENDC/PV.395, paras. 60 et seq.) we stressed the importance attached by the Soviet delegation to the urgent solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament. We note that in the Committee there is sufficient unanimity of opinion to the effect that this task is a priority one, and that in itself is an encouraging factor. We now have to find a common approach to the way in which this problem is to be tackled.

44. The Soviet delegation holds the view that in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee great importance should be attached to the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. This question has long been ripe for solution. As long ago as 1961 the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 1653 (XVI) known as the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. That Declaration very clearly expressed the negative attitude of the States Members of the United Nations to the use of nuclear weapons and stressed the necessity of precluding the possibility of their use. At the same time the General Assembly supported the idea of concluding a special convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

45. It is well known that the majority of States Members of the United Nations not only voted in favour of resolution 1653 (XVI) but subsequently, in reply to the questionnaire of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, expressed themselves in favour of concluding a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, in addition to the vote in the General Assembly there also took place, so to speak, an

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international referendum on this question, which confirmed the desire of the peoples of the world to safeguard themselves against the threat of nuclear bombs.

46. If we turn to the positions of the members of our Committee on the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, we see that the overwhelming majority of States participating in our Conference have, in principle, expressed themselves in favour of discussing this question in the Committee and of concluding an appropriate agreement.

47. It is hardly necessary to dwell in detail on the position of the socialist States. They have steadfastly supported, and continue to support, that prohibition and are making every effort to concentrate the discussion in the Committee on the search for measures that would lead in that direction. Equally well known is the attitude of the majority of the non-aligned States to the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, Ethiopia took the initiative which led to the adoption of a Declaration in that regard by the sixteenth session of the General Assembly (resolution 1653 (XVI)). The position of Burma, as expressed in its reply to the questionnaire of the Secretary-General, consists in: "support for any action which has for its objective the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as those utilizing nuclear and thermo-nuclear energy." (A/5518, annex II)

48. The representative of Nigeria, Alhaji Sule Kólo, at our meeting of 20 March expressed readiness to support this "indeed important aspect of disarmament" -- the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.396, para. 19). We could also quote in this regard the statements made by the representatives of other non-aligned States members of our Committee.

49. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy, although advancing reservations and objections regarding the solution proposed by the General Assembly for prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, also agreed that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should take up the discussion of this problem. It would be hard to believe that those States would want the Committee to take up the discussion of a question which in their view had no chance of being solved.

50. Nevertheless, today we must observe with regret the absence of progress in solving the problem of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. That situation has

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been brought about by the fact that the Western Powers, and first and foremost those which possess nuclear weapons, are not prepared to abandon their negative position on this question and to look for a mutually acceptable way towards its solution. That fact is sometimes regarded as an insurmountable obstacle to progress on the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

51. In that connexion we should like to note that the history of disarmament negotiations shows a number of cases in which positions which at first seemed to be irreconcilable were gradually brought closer together as a result of efforts by the parties, thus leading to agreements. In this case likewise it is the duty of all of us to exert the utmost efforts and good will and try to gain a better understanding of each other's views so as to find possible points of contact.

52. It is from this standpoint that we should like to dwell on certain arguments which are being advanced against prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We are told that instead of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons it would be better to accomplish a more extensive measure, namely to solve the question of general and complete disarmament. In the reply of the United States Secretary of State to the questionnaire of the Secretary-General we read:

> "While my Government deplores the necessity to arm with weapons of mass destruction, it believes that a prohibition on their use, unaccompanied by measures leading to the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, cannot provide any real or lasting protection to potential victims of nuclear attack." (A/5174, annex II)

53. Obviously it would be better immediately to achieve general and complete disarmament or, as a first step, to prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has long been advocating a programme of general and complete disarmament. We attach very great importance to that question and it is our intention to deal with it in detail at a subsequent meeting of the Committee. But so far, unfortunately, there has been no progress in that field. In those conditions it would be wrong to set against general and complete disarmament such partial measures as prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it is precisely the accomplishment of such measures that would facilitate progress in the field of general and complete disarmament.

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54. Another argument against the conclusion of an appropriate convention is that it would be useless, because it would not be complied with anyway. Such a concept casts doubt upon the value of any international agreement. In our statement of 18 March we referred to the existing experience in the field of the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, which provides us with an important precedent also in regard to the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.395, para.71).

55. It must be noted that in general the binding force of such international agreements is in fact based partly on moral compulsion, partly on mutual interests and partly on the fear of retaliatory action by the other party.

56. The Government of Ethiopia, in its reply to the Secretary-General's questionnaire, rightly noted, in regard to a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, that:

> "... since the Charter of the United Nations itself is basically and rightly founded on moral compulsion, and since the substance of the contemplated convention will be subject to the same rules for effectiveness, it is hard to detect wherein the weakness of the latter lies." (A/5518, annex II)

57. Against the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons the argument is advanced that the implementation of such a measure would be not only useless but even harmful because it would have negative implications for the security of States. That means, in other words, that the implementation of such a measure would run counter to the concept of so-called "mutual deterrence" put forward by the Western nuclear Powers. We consider that "mutual deterrence" not only is not a safeguard of peace but, quite the contrary, stands for a very dangerous condition which might at any time lead to a catastrophe. To accept that concept means to deprive oneself of the possibility of seeking to strengthen international security through nuclear disarmament.

58. We are gratified to note that our approach to this question is shared by other States. This is shown in particular by the statement made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, at our meeting on 18 March of this year when he stated that his delegation refused to believe that the so-called deterrent power of nuclear weapons can be regarded as "a positive factor justifying their existence" (ENDC/PV.395, para.58). We share his conviction that we cannot ascribe to nuclear weapons the merit for the fact that the last twenty years have been peaceful in most parts of the world. The view of

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the Mexican delegation that peace and international security should not depend on nuclear weapons will no doubt find support both in this Committee and outside it.

59. It is precisely because we base ourselves on that approach to the unfounded concept of mutual deterrence, that we are in favour of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The terms of reference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament consist not in defending the concept of mutual deterrence, but in finding ways and means of eliminating the threat to humanity which a war with the use of nuclear weapons represents. Bearing in mind that understanding we call for constructive negotiations which would make it possible to achieve the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Such a prohibition would be a step towards renunciation of the further improvement and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, would bring the possibility of their destruction nearer, and facilitate the solution of other questions of nuclear disarmament.

60. The assumption by States of an obligation not to use nuclear weapons would have important political consequences. The implementation of this measure would be a serious restraining factor for those who would like to threaten with nuclear weapons or to use such weapons. At the political level it would be the first practical step towards the elimination of the differences between States arising from the possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would help to lessen international tension, to make the whole international atmosphere healthier and to strengthen confidence among States.

61. A very important advantage of our proposal is that its implementation is not linked with any technical complications. It does not require special measures for the establishment of control, the creation of any machinery for that purpose, and so forth.

62. Having before us the task of exploring all ways and means to achieve agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, we should like to remind the Committee that in the fairly recent past the very Western Powers which do not support the idea of complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons expressed themselves in favour of achieving such a prohibition to some extent. Thus in 1957 the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada introduced in the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Committee a joint proposal under which:

> "Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defence." (Fifth report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, DC/113, annex 5)

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63. In connexion with the abovementioned questionnaire of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United States Government in 1962 declared that it: "can and does offer the fullest assurances that it will never use any weapon, large or small, with aggressive intent." (A/5174, annex II)

64. The well-known United States theorist, Mr. Kissinger, who today is Special Assistant to the President of the United States for Nationsl Security Affairs, says in his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy:[1]

> "Even a unilateral declaration of what we understand by limited war could accomplish a great deal, because it would provide a strong incentive to the other side to test its feasibility."

If that consideration is applicable to a limited war within the meaning given by Mr. Kissinger, it is also applicable to such a measure as a declaration by the nuclear Powers to renounce the use of nuclear weapons. To use Mr. Kissinger's own words, it is possible to say that such a declaration would accomplish a great deal because it would provide a strong incentive to try this possibility, to renounce the intention to unleash a nuclear war.

65. In this connexion we should like to put a question to the representatives of the Western Powers in this Committee: To what extent does the declaration of the four Western Powers, quoted by us, and the subsequent individual declaration by the United States Government of its willingness to assume an obligation not to use nuclear weapons as a means of aggression, reflect their present position on this subject? We raise that question in order to try to find new ways and means to solve the problem of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

66. Taking into account the great importance of this problem and the insistent demand of many States for prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, we ask the Western Powers whether they are prepared to seek in present-day conditions mutually acceptable ways and means in order to reach agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We ask that question because in the past those Powers indicated that they were prepared to agree to a partial prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, that is, prohibition of the use of such weapons as a means of aggression.

67. We believe that in spite of the fact that there is at present no general agreement on the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, this direction is an important and promising one, that is, it offers hopes of success. We for our part wish to achieve

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[1] Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, New York, 1957, p. 224.

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real progress along that path. If the Western Powers are prepared to confirm their previous agreement to establish restrictions in regard to the use of nuclear weapons, we should also like to hear their opinion as to what should be the nature of those restrictions. Taking into account the considerations and ideas which may be put forward in this connexion, we are prepared to seek ways and means to solve the problem of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

68. In our view, our task is to narrow the sphere of the possible use of nuclear weapons step by step; the more complete the sphere of restriction or prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the better. Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be regarded as a link in the chain of nuclear disarmament measures. We consider that in solving this problem we cannot by-pass the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and that the time has now come precisely for this link. It would be the next step in developing the security guarantees which, in June 1968, were given by the three nuclear Powers -- the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union -- in the declaration of their intention, in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council, to guarantee support, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the non-proliferation Treaty that is the victim of aggression or the object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used (Security Council resolution 255 (1968) (ENDC/226*).

69. We should now like to state our views on another important question relating to nuclear disarmament -- the problem of underground nuclear weapon tests. During past sessions of the Committee and at the present session also great attention has been given to this question. We consider that the question of prohibiting all tests, including underground tests, is an important and urgent one. The cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments would create a serious obstacle to the expansion of nuclear arsenals and would be an important step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race. This opinion, as our discussions have shown, is shared by many of the delegations in the Committee.

70. The Soviet Union has consistently advocated the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in all environments, including underground tests. In the Soviet memorandum of 1 July 1968 on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament it is pointed out in this connexion that:

> "The Soviet Government is prepared to reach agreement without delay on the banning of underground nuclear-weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection to control observance of the ban." (ENDC/227, point 5)

71. We listened with great interest to the statement made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal (ENDC/PV.399, para 7 et seq.), when she submitted to the Committee a working paper (ENDC/242) on the question of banning under-ground nuclear weapon tests. We are

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studying this new proposal of Sweden with the attention it deserves. It is not my intention at the present moment to enter into a detailed analysis of the Swedish paper. Nevertheless, I should like to stress that the proposal put forward by the Swedish delegation is based on the fact that the present level of development of seismology makes it possible to judge the nature of a seismic phenomenon accurately enough. The position of the Soviet Union is precisely that national means of detection are adequate to identify any underground nuclear explosion.

72. An important role in achieving an agreement to ban underground nuclear explosions is attributed by Sweden and by other Powers to an international exchange of seismological data. The Swedish delegation has already put forward the idea of international co-operation in the field of the exchange of such data -- the idea of setting up a so-called "detection club" (ENDC/154). We have expressed in the past and should now like to reaffirm our positive attitude to this proposal, because it is aimed at facilitating the conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. We should now like to emphasize the willingness of the Soviet Union to exchange national seismological data with the other parties to a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests. At the same time we consider that participation in an international exchange of seismological data should not impose on the parties participating in such an exchange any obligations in respect of international inspection or control on their territories and that the evaluation of the data collected should be made not by some international agency but by each State for itself.

73. In endeavouring to accelerate the solution of the problem of banning all nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Union has expressed and reaffirms its support for the proposal (ENDC/144, p.33) of the United Arab Republic concerning the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests above a threshold of yield with a magnitude of 4.75, accompanied by a moratorium accepted voluntarily by States on underground tests below that threshold (DC/PV.75, para.134) -- although we are convinced that even explosions below 4.75 in magnitude can be detected by national means. It is only because we are anxious to make progress towards nuclear disarmament that we accept the proposal of the United Arab Republic.

74. We are convinced that the problem of the complete prohibition of underground nuclear tests can be solved if a constructive approach is adopted and all States are guided by the desire to reach agreement on this important question as soon as possible. At the same time we should like to emphasize that the categorical demand that the problem of the prohibition of underground tests be solved exclusively on the basis of the on-site inspections does not contribute to progress in achieving agreement on this urgent problem relating to nuclear disarmament.

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75. In putting forward the aforementioned proposals in the field of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Government is also ready to accept more far-reaching measures which would lead to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet memorandum of 1 July 1968 contains a proposal that all nuclear Powers

> "... should forthwith enter into negotiations on stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and on the reduction of stockpiles, to be followed by the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control." (ENDC/227, point 2.)

We are prepared to undertake negotiations both on those measures as a whole and on some of them separately.

76. Another proposal has been put forward in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, namely to stop the manufacture of fissionable material for military purposes. In the statement made on 8 April by the representative of the United States, proposals in this regard were repeated which contain, as mentioned by Mr. Fisher (ENDC/PV.401, para.8), a new element -- the use for control not of special verification machinery but of the system of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

77. The position of the Soviet Government in regard to the United States proposal to discontinue the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes is, I think, sufficiently well known to all the members of the Committee. We have already pointed out that this proposal would not lead to the reduction of existing arsenals of nuclear weapons and would not diminish the possibility of the further production of such weapons. This proposal is mainly due to the over-production in the United States of nuclear materials for military purposes. Thus it would not solve the problem of eliminating or reducing the threat of a nuclear war, even if all nuclear Powers agreed to carry out this measure. But the question arises: what would be the consequences of such a measure if not all the nuclear Powers agreed to it? The United States proposal gives no answer to that question.

78. We should now like to touch on a problem which is also directly linked with disarmament -- the problem of the security of States. In this connexion, we should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the Appeal by the States members of the Warsaw Pact, addressed to all European countries, adopted in Budapest on 17 March last (ENDC/243). In that Appeal, consideration is given to questions of ensuring security and

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co-operation in Europe, a continent where twice during the life of one generation world wars have been unleashed. The Budapest conference put forward a broad programme of action on questions of European security. The participants addressed to all European governments an Appeal to redouble their efforts towards strengthening peace and security in Europe.

79. An important element in that Appeal is the proposal to hold a general European conference on the question of strengthening peace and security in Europe. The Appeal declares:

> "Such a conference would meet the interests of all European States. It would make it possible together to find ways and means of doing away with the division of Europe into military groupings and achieving peaceful co-operation among European States and peoples."

80. As is well known, the proposal to hold such a conference was put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries almost three years ago. If we bear in mind the interest of consolidating peace, there is no weighty reason to postpone the convening of this conference.

81. In confirming their proposals contained in the Declaration adopted in Bucharest in 1966, the participants in the Budapest Conference took an important initiative by expressing themselves in favour of an early meeting of the representatives of all the European States concerned in order to establish by mutual agreement the procedure for convening the conference and determining its agenda.

82. In this connexion we should like to stress that, whereas in other continents regional conferences devoted to political questions, including questions of security, have often been convened, in Europe there has not been a single conference of this type since the war. The socialist countries consider that the purpose of a general European conference should be to work out the conditions for shielding Europe from the danger of new military conflicts, for removing all possibility of the use of force and the threat of the use of force to change frontiers and the existing situation. This conference should open up broad prospects for the development of co-operation among all European countries regardless of their social structure, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

83. We think that the creation of a durable system of European security would provide a real opportunity to promote co-operation amongst all European countries in all fields.

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We also believe that this conference could pave the way to durable peace in Europe. The Soviet delegation considers that this measure would be of great value at the present time and would help progress to be made in solving disarmament questions.

84. Mr. ZELLEKE (Ethiopia): A year has already passed since this Committee completed its part of the work on the non-proliferation Treaty, which was in turn honoured in good faith by the General Assembly when it approved resolution 2373 (XXII) (ENDC/226*) by an overwhelming majority in June 1968. Since then a large majority of States -- nearly ninety -- have signed the Treaty.

85. While we express our gratification at the general trend towards acceptance of the Treaty by so large a number of States, we at the same time cannot fail to note that the Treaty still lacks the necessary number of ratifications to enable it to enter into force. This lack of ratification is, no doubt, partly due to the absence of the signatures of a few important countries with advanced nuclear technology situated in various regions of the world, and partly due to the prolonged silence by the two nuclear super-Powers, the originators of the Treaty, with respect to finalizing the necessary process of ratification.

86. In this connexion the Ethiopian delegation fully shares the hope expressed in this Committee that the recent action taken by the United States Senate to complete the process of ratification will soon be reciprocated by the other party and thus definitely attract the few additional important signatures whose absence may stand in the way of early ratifications by other States.

87. Since the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty this Committee has already had one session and is now engaged on its second session. Short as may have been the session last summer, this Committee, in an endeavour to revert to some of the most important disarmament measures which were comparatively neglected during the long and complicated negotiations on the non-proliferation Treaty succeeded in laying down a broad agenda outline (ENDC/236, p.3) to guide its future course of action. That agenda, together with article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, which links other disarmament negotiations as an integral part of the Treaty, should now serve as a point of departure for this Committee.

88. Both the agenda and article VI recognizethe need and urgency to pursue negotiations on further disarmament measures with particular stress on the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and on nuclear disarmament.

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89. From time to time this Committee has been reminded of the great danger and destructive force of the existing nuclear weapons at the disposal of the nuclear P wers which have been estimated to be sufficient to destroy all living beings in the world, not only once but several times over. No less significant is the exhorbitant consumption of human and material resources, which are so lacking for peaceful development in the developing parts of the world but are being wasted in the futile spiral of the arms race.

90. In this connexion we need only remind ourselves of the report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the experts' studies of the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons (A/6858). More recently, at the opening of the present session, the leader of the Mexican delegation has refreshed our minds about the grim facts of nuclear weapons with frightening but incontestable figures (ENDC/PV.395, paras. 38-39).

91. In the face of all this, no effective measure has yet been taken to curb the nuclear arms race. Nuclear weapons continue to be perfected and produced. Defensive and offensive strategic missile systems continue to change phases and threaten to upset the existing delicate balance of deterrence, thereby making disarmament negotiations difficult, if not impossible.

92. That is the painful reality that is gradually leading to a growing impatience with and weakening of faith in the sincerity of the meaningful disarmament negotiations being undertaken here and elsewhere. This Committee, more than any other body, should take heed of that fact and proceed most energetically with the determined aim of arriving at tangible results on some of the outstanding concrete measures of disarmament.

93. In that connexion the Ethiopian delegation would like first of all to join all others which have called upon the Soviet Union and the United States to engage immediately in the long-promised bilateral talks to bring to an end the present trend of an endless race in strategic missile systems. The present drive towards peace and détente provides, in our opinion, the necessary international climate for a fruitful exchange of views on that issue. It should not be left unexploited. A great deal of work here in the Committee, especially on nuclear arms measures, is also dependent upon

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the outcome of those bilateral negotiations. Once more we welcome the clear intention to begin discussions immediately, an intention that can be discerned from various statements and Press reports.

94. In the meantime this Committee can proceed, we hope, to streamline and arrive at tangible results on some of the concrete proposals already submitted by some delegations. I am referring particularly to the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed (ENDC/240) and that of the cessation of underground nuclear tests (ENDC/242), on each of which we are fortunate to have a working text.

95. The whole question of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof is, as we are told, relatively new to modern peaceful and military or quasi-military technology. Yet it is always believed that in the sea and its floor lies hidden one of the greatest sources of wealth for the continuing needs of the peaceful advancement of the world. If nothing is done from now on to stop the already creeping arms race from taking hold on the bottom of the sea and ocean, the world will not only lament the forbidding barriers to reaching for those potential rexources for its ever-expanding needs but will also be creating conditions for its own destruction. That is why it becones imperative that an urgent measure to make the sea-bed and the ocean floor free from any armaments build-up for warlike purposes should be negotiated immediately.

96. The positive notes contained in the message to this Committee by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (ENDC/238) and President Nixon's letter to the leader of the United States delegation, Ambassador Smith (ENDC/239*), relating to this question, give definite assurance that this Committee can fruitfully discuss this item during its present session. In addition, the Committee can draw upon the experiences and values of the outer space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)) and the Treaty on the peaceful use of Antarctica,[2/] which are similar in essence to the present proposal for the sea-bed. That should, in our opinion, expedite negotiations leading to concrete results to be submitted to the General Assembly at its next session.

97. In this regard my delegation would like to pay a tribute to the Soviet Union for the initiative it has taken in presenting us with a complete, comprehensive draft treaty so early in our present session. The Ethiopian Government is studying the draft treaty with care and attention. We hope to be able to give our views on it at a later date.

2/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 402, pp.71 et seq.

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98. For the moment, however, we should like to give our agreement in principle to the general principle of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor as contained in the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union a principle which corresponds to the spirit behind General Assembly resolution 2467 (XXIII).

99. Needless to say, however, the most important and urgent task of this Committee still remains the outstanding issue of nuclear disarmament measures, which can no longer be postponed. Of those measures we have the long-standing question of the comprehensive test ban and that of the cut-off of fissionable materials for weapon purposes. Ever since the signing of the Moscow partial test ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) every passing year has brought added requests for and urgency about completing that Treaty by agreeing on the prohibition of undergound testing. At each of its successive sessions the United Nations General Assembly has unfailingly placed that question high on its list of priorities and requested this Committee as a matter of urgency, to elaborate and agree upon a treaty banning underground nuclear testing. The same request has been reiterated in General Assembly resolution 2455 (XXIII)(ENDC/237).

100. We are indeed grateful in this respect to the Swedish delegation for its knowledgable insight into this field, which has stimulated discussions in this Committee in the past, as well as for the step forward taken at this session by that delegation in presenting us with the draft working treaty provisions contained in document ENDC/242.

101. With regard to this question we have the benefit of various expert studies on the technical feasibility of seismic means of identification, such as the SIPRI report on the results of the expert studies on seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions, a summary of which was presented to this Committee as a working paper last year in document ENDC/230. The recent offer by the United States to conduct underground explosions for the experimental purposes of long-range seismic detection methods, reaffirmed by the United States delegation in a statement to this Committee on 25 March 1969 (ENDC/PV.397, paras. 23-24) may yet prove to be a step forward for research in that direction.

102. There is no denying the fact that, despite continued research carried out by experts in seismic technology, it has not so far been possible clearly to distinguish man-made underground explosions from underground natural phenomena below a given range of magnitude. This is further complicated by the different methods and scale of

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measurements used in seismic means of verification. As we have been reminded by the statement of the Swedish delegation on 1 April 1969 (ENDC/PV.399, para. 27) it is also to be feared that modern technology will never make it possible, at least in the foreseeable future, to verify and identify all underground explosions.

103. It has therefore become more apparent than ever before that the international community must intensify its efforts to find solutions to this anomaly of unbalanced technological development in the military and peaceful areas by redoubling its efforts at research in the science of seismology. That is why the Ethiopian delegation would like to suggest that this Committee should request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to investigate the possibility of creating an international research agency with a universal membership using as a nucleus in so far as is possible existing semi-international bodies such as SIPRI. Such an agency could also be attached to an already existing world-wide organization such as the World Meteorological Organization, which is doing work in this field.

104. In that way we believe that the independent and co-ordinated research that could be carried out by such an agency would greatly contribute to the further advancement of seismological means of verification of underground explosions. It is also hoped that such an international agency would serve as a verification agency for a treaty banning underground nuclear explosions, just as the IAEA has been used for a similar purpose under the non-proliferation Treaty. Subject to the comments to be made by members of this Committee, the Ethiopian delegation is prepared to formalize its suggestion.

105. Apart from these technicalities of verification of underground explosions, the question of banning underground nuclear tests has been the subject of wide discussion and has given rise to numerous proposals from all corners of this Committee. Perhaps the Secretariat would be good enough to compile all these proposals and suggestions in one document for us so that we will be able to see them all together and examine them in detail.

106. Of the various proposals before us, in our opinion it would seem worth while to examine seriously the United Kingdom proposal for "a phased operation by starting with an agreed annual quota of underground test explosions" (ENDC/232, para. 6) and find a place for it in the Swedish working paper on treaty provisions. We support this phased approach in the hope that in the meantime further developments in the field of seismic detection and verification will be achieved and that a propitious climate will be created for taking the calculated political risk that is always indispensable in disarmament measures of such a nature.

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107. No less important and urgent in the field of nuclear disarmament measures is the long-standing proposal for a cut-off of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Five years have already passed since the nuclear Powers themselves put forward proposals to this Committee for the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. I am referring to the proposals in documents ENDC/120 and ENDC/131, submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, in which both those nuclear Powers and the United Kingdom pledged themselves to take unilateral action to reduce substantially the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This Committee needs to be informed from time to time of the practical steps taken to fulfil this unilateral declaration while at the same time continuing its drive to arrive at a formal agreement with adequate verification.

108. The need to arrive at an agreement on the cut-off of fissionable materials for weapons purposes gains added importance now in view of the non-proliferation Treaty, which imposes unlimited restrictions on non-nuclear signatory States on engaging in the production of nuclear weapons or any other explosive device. Non-nuclear-weapon signatory States have accepted such restrictions in the hope and belief that the nuclear Powers will eventually agree to stop production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and hence close the circle by stopping what is known as vertical proliferation. That is why unanimous support and importance are attached to article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty and why the Joint Memorandum of September 1965 described the Treaty as "not an end in itself but only a means to an end" (ENDC/158*).

109. As in the case of all other measures of disarmament, the basic difficulties of an agreement on a cut-off seem to revolve around the question of verification. But here again we already have important suggestions that we should draw upon the experience of negotiations on the safeguard clause for the non-proliferation Treaty and should employ the same system of safeguards for the verification of a cut-off agreement in so far as that is practicable. We welcome the favourable disposition of the United States delegation -- as expressed in its statement of 8 April 1969 (ENDC/PV.401., para. 8),-- to accept verification similar to that specified in the non-proliferation Treaty.

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110. In this respect it is important to realize -- and we affirm this belief once more -- that all peaceful nuclear establishments, in both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States, should be universally subject to IAEA safeguards. Only with such compliance will it be possible to work out verification measures for a cut-off agreement.

111. Finally, this Committee has before it two important questions concerning the outlawing of the use of weapons of mass destruction. One of these relates to nuclear weapons and the other to chemical and bacteriological weapons. On both of them we already have a basis on which to work, namely, resolution 1653 (XVI), which declares the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons to be contrary to the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity; and the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons for war purposes. My delegation listened very carefully to the statement made today by the Soviet representative regarding the prohibition of nuclear weapons; we shall study it and make comments on it later. For the moment, however, I should like to pass over these highly important questions because we intend to make detailed comments on them later.

112. I should like to conclude my statement by saying a few words on the methods of work of this Committee. It seems inevitable that in order to arrive at speedy and concrete results concerning any one of the given measures of disarmament this Committee will have to concentrate its attention on that measure. That is why my delegation welcomes the suggestion of an additional formal meeting of this Committee. I should like to add that this additional meeting should be reserved entirely for one of the measures on which the co-Chairmen might advise the Committee that the possibility exists for a fruitful exchange of views leading to a concrete result. We would then be in a position to prepare ourselves and concentrate our attention on that particular item on that particular day, while the normal course of discussion would continue on the other items during the two regular meetings each week. In that way the Committee might be in a position to arrive, between now and the General Assembly, at a conclusion on at least one of the measures.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 402nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. C.O. Hollist, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Ethiopia.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 15 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.